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To be, or not to be?
Are induced pluripotent stem cells potential babies, and does it matter?
Katrien Devolder
in July 2009, two research groups indep­endently reported the first successful generation of adult mice from induced 
pluripotent stem cells (ipScs; Kang et al, 
2009; zhao et al, 2009). these experiments 
are part of ongoing research into the dif­
ferences and similarities between ipScs—
which are derived from normal somatic cells 
by the activation of certain key genes—and 
embryonic stem cells (EScs). if ipScs are 
found to be similar to EScs in terms of their 
ability to differentiate into any cell type, it 
might make the use of the latter in research 
redundant in the long term. this would be 
beneficial to biomedical research on stem 
cells and their medical use, as ipScs are 
likely to be cheap and easy to produce 
and would circumvent many of the ethical 
issues posed by research using human EScs 
(hEScs). However, the very same research 
results might raise ethical challenges for 
those who accept ipSc research but reject 
hESc research as ethically objectionable: 
similarities could cast doubt on one of the 
main arguments against hESc research, that 
of ‘potentiality’.
to create mice from ipScs, the authors 
of both 2009 publications used a tech­
nique called tetraploid complementation. 
this method has been used successfully 
with mouse EScs to produce viable mice 
and is the most stringent test of the pluripo­
tency of stem cells. it involves creating 
tetraploid embryos by fusing the blast­
omeres of two­cell­stage embryos. as they 
have twice the normal number of chromo­
somes, tetraploid embryos cannot develop 
normally and do not result in an animal. 
the tetraploid embryos are grown to the 
blastocyst stage, injected with mouse EScs 
and implanted in the uterus of a surrogate 
mouse. the resulting pups are derived solely 
from the EScs, with the tetraploid embryos 
acting as a substitute troph ectoderm: they 
form the placenta and the membranes that 
nourish and protect the developing organ­
ism but do not contribute to the ‘embryo 
proper’ (nagy et al, 1990; li et al, 2005). 
tetraploid complementation experiments 
show that mouse EScs and ipScs have 
not perm anently lost the capacity to grow 
into live offspring. although moral issues 
prevent these experiments from being 
carried out in humans, hEScs and human 
ipScs (hipScs) might have the same capac­
ity, despite some differences in human 
and mouse stem cell populations (li et al, 
2009). on the basis of these results, some 
have concluded that we must regard hEScs 
and hipScs as potential human beings 
(Denker, 2009).
Some critics of the use of human embryos for research believe that a human embryo should not be harmed 
or destroyed because it has significant value 
from the moment of conception by virtue of 
its potential to develop into a human being 
(the president’s council on Bioethics, 2002; 
condic et al, 2009). However, many bio­
ethicists and others have pointed out weak­
nesses in the potentiality argument. an initial 
problem is one of logic: acorns are not oak 
trees, nor are eggs chickens or omelettes. 
Just because something has the potential 
to become something different, we should 
not regard it as if it has already realised 
that potential. unless and until we achieve 
immortality, all of us share one important 
and inexorable potential: we are all poten­
tially dead—but it does not follow that we 
must be treated as though we are already 
dead (Devolder & Harris, 2005). if we intend 
to treat something that has the potential to 
become something different in a special way, 
then additional arguments are needed.
the second difficulty with the poten­
tiality argument relates to its scope. if the 
human embryo has the potential to become 
a human being and is supposedly morally 
important by virtue of that potential, then 
every other cell or group of cells with a 
similar potential must be assigned equal 
moral status. this is sometimes called 
‘the extension argument’ (annis, 1984). 
in keeping with the extension argument, 
some have suggested that the development 
of somatic cell nuclear transfer means that 
we must now treat every cell in the body 
as having special moral significance, 
which has obviously absurd implications 
(Magill & neaves, 2009). For reasons that 
i explain later, this version of the exten­
sion argument is somewhat problematic. 
However, the recent experiments show­
ing that ipScs can produce live offspring 
through tetraploid complementation now 
allow us to develop an extension argument 
that shows more convincingly the failure 
of the potentiality argument. indeed, the 
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results raise an interesting dilemma for 
those who support the use of ipScs but 
not hEScs in research. Faced with the find­
ing that ipScs could also be regarded as 
potential human beings, opponents to the 
use of hEScs must now either treat ipScs 
as morally significant entities worthy of 
protection, or admit that early embryos 
do not derive their significance from the 
potential they possess. one way out of the 
dilemma would be to demonstrate that 
ipScs lack some morally significant kind 
of potential that embryos possess, and sev­
eral authors have adduced arguments in 
support of this position.
the most common argument to demonstrate the moral difference between ipScs and/or hEScs and 
embryos is that ipScs and/or hEScs alone 
cannot give rise to a full­grown organism 
(condic et al, 2009). Whereas embryos 
have the capacity to produce their own 
tropho blast, which is necessary for embry­
onic develop ment, hEScs and ipScs require 
the provision of a surrogate tropho blast by 
tetraploid helper cells.
although this observation is true, it is 
not clear why it is morally relevant. a blast­
ocyst consists of two distinct cell types: the 
inner cell mass (icM) cells, which becomes 
the embryo proper and, event ually, the 
adult human being; and tropho blast cells, 
which contribute to the placental sup­
port system. although the trophoblast 
is essential for the further development 
of the embryo, it does not become 
part of the full­grown organism. 
arguably, it is the icM cells that 
are of moral significance, as the 
tropho blast merely provides 
the appropriate environment 
for these cells to develop into 
the embryo.
For the sake of argument, 
let us suppose that a couple 
undergoing in vitro fertilization 
can only produce embryos 
with a defective trophoblast. 
Suppose further that tetra­
ploid complementation 
has become a routine 
technique with human 
cells and that the 





EScs all require a trophoblast or another 
suitable substitute to develop.
the fact that the trophoblast and the embryo proper are in constant inter­action, and that the latter needs nutri­
ents and signals from the former to develop 
further, does not make this less plausible. 
after all, cell potency always depends on 
interaction with a context (camporesi, 
2007; testa et al, 2007; Baertschi & Mauron, 
2008). this is as true for EScs and ipScs as it 
is for zygotes. a cell can exist in many states 
in the body or in the lab, depending on what 
sort of information it receives. to develop 
into an embryo, a fetus and a full­grown 
human being, a zygote must implant in the 
uterus and communicate and interact with 
neighbouring cells, the extracellular matrix 
and the blood or lymph, and must not be 
exposed to dangerous substances. likewise, 
the development of EScs and ipScs into a 
fetus and an adult organism depends on 
continuous interaction with a similarly 
supportive environment. the fact that this 
environment is provided by researchers is 
morally irrelevant, as this is also the case 
with in vitro embryos that are implanted in a 
woman’s uterus.
one possible reply is that, unlike ipScs 
and EScs, the zygote has some sort of force 
inside it that determines what it will become. 
the context or environment merely allows 
the zygote’s potential to be expressed. ipScs 
and EScs, by contrast, need external manip­
ulations that determine to what the cells will 
give rise. the first type of potential is typi­
cally referred to as ‘intrinsic’ or ‘active’, the 
second type—possessed by EScs or ipScs—
as ‘extrinsic’ or ‘passive’. Stephen Holland, 
a bioethicist at the university of york, uK, 
uses the example of a conker and a horse 
chestnut tree to illustrate these potentials. to 
become a horse chestnut tree, a conker just 
needs ‘appropriate circumstances’, but for 
the tree to be turned into a table, an external 
agent—a carpenter—is needed (Holland, 
2003). the potentiality argument is based on 
the view that entities with intrinsic potential 
to become full­grown human beings should 
not be used for research.
this argument might show that somatic 
cells, at least, lack intrinsic potential, as one 
could argue that only the cell resulting from 
nuclear transfer—that is, after the somatic 
cell has been fused with an enucleated 
egg—has intrinsic potential. only after this 
event does a new cell exist that could give 
rise to live offspring. However, Holland’s 
to replace the defective tropho blast with 
tetraploid helper cells. to circumvent the 
moral issue of using embryos to provide a 
surrogate trophectoderm, let us also sup­
pose that it can be derived from ipScs—
there is now considerable experimental 
evidence demonstrating that hEScs can dif­
ferentiate into trophoblast lineages (gerami­
naini et al, 2004; Harun et al, 2006), so the 
same might be true for ipScs. Would those 
who think that ‘potential’ is what defines 
moral value object to helping the parents to 
fulfil their reproductive wish? probably not. 
yet, the structure of the full embryo—icM 
plus trophoblast—has been compromised. 
this would suggest that it is the potential of 
the icM cells that is valued by people who 
believe moral status is to be derived from 
‘potential’. But, it would be difficult to dif­
ferentiate the potential of these cells from 
that of ipScs or EScs: icM cells, ipScs and 
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argument might be weaker against ipScs, 
as an embryo can be created entirely from 
ipScs by simply transferring them into an 
appropriate environment—no new cell 
needs to be created. it would be similar to 
placing a conker in fertile soil.
in any case, we have to ask ourselves whether the defenders of the poten­tiality principle really do think that 
intrinsic potential is of significant moral 
importance. Suppose that a fertility clinic 
creates an in vitro embryo in the context 
of a fertility treatment. the embryo is dam­
aged, which makes it impossible for it 
to develop beyond the stage of an eight­
week­old fetus. Fortunately, researchers 
know how to repair it by using some rela­
tively simple genetic manipulations so that 
it will again be capable of developing into 
a baby. Most defenders of the potentiality 
argument would support the application 
of science to restore the embryo to its full 
potential. However, the damaged embryo 
does not have the intrinsic potential to 
develop into a human being; thus, accord­
ing to the potentiality view, we do not have 
any reason to rescue it. if defenders of the 
potentiality argument think we should res­
cue it, then this is because external agents 
and their actions are part of what makes an 
embryo possess potential. But ipScs and 
EScs also have the potential to become 
a human being when certain actions are 
performed by external agents.
recent advances in ipSc research are 
promising from both scientific and medi­
cal points of view, yet they also present a 
serious challenge to those who oppose the 
generation and use of hEScs for research. 
although ipScs, EScs and embryos are not 
identical in their potential to develop into 
a human being, they do all have an inher­
ent capacity to give rise to adult organisms 
when placed in an appropriate environ­
ment. this presents a dilemma for oppo­
nents of embryo research: if they continue 
to appeal to the potentiality argument, they 
also risk undermining the use of ipScs for 
research. alternatively, if they reject the 
potentiality argument, they must eschew 
restrictions on embryo research or seek 
some other basis for them.
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